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Abstract—Many JavaScript applications perform HTTP re-
quests to web APIs, relying on the request URL, HTTP method,
and request data to be constructed correctly by string operations.
Traditional compile-time error checking, such as calling a non-
existent method in Java, are not available for checking whether
such requests comply with the requirements of a web API. In
this paper, we propose an approach to statically check web API
requests in JavaScript. Our approach first extracts a request’s
URL string, HTTP method, and the corresponding request
data using an inter-procedural string analysis, and then checks
whether the request conforms to given web API specifications. We
evaluated our approach by checking whether web API requests in
JavaScript files mined from GitHub are consistent or inconsistent
with publicly available API specifications. From the 6575 requests
in scope, our approach determined whether the request’s URL
and HTTP method was consistent or inconsistent with web
API specifications with a precision of 96.0%. Our approach
also correctly determined whether extracted request data was
consistent or inconsistent with the data requirements with a
precision of 87.9% for payload data and 99.9% for query data.
In a systematic analysis of the inconsistent cases, we found that
many of them were due to errors in the client code. The here
proposed checker can be integrated with code editors or with
continuous integration tools to warn programmers about code
containing potentially erroneous requests.
Keywords-Static analysis; JavaScript; Web APIs
I. INTRODUCTION
Programmers write applications using a growing variety
of publicly accessible web services. Catalogs such as IBM’s
API Harmony [1], [2], Mashape’s PublicAPIs [3], or Pro-
grammableWeb [4] list thousands of web Application Pro-
gramming Interfaces (web APIs) exposed by these services.
Applications invoke web APIs by sending HTTP requests to
a dedicated URL using one of its supported HTTP methods;
required data is sent as query or path parameters, or within
the HTTP request body. The URL, HTTP method, and data to
send are all basically strings, constructed by string operations
within the applications. Figure 1 shows an exemplary excerpt
of such a JavaScript application performing these actions.
When a request targets a URL that does not exist or sends
data that does not comply with the requirements of the web
API, a runtime error occurs. This prevalent calling mechanism
for web APIs—which relies on a string URL, a HTTP method,
as well as string input and output—does not allow type-safety
checking. In other words, checks for traditional compile-time
errors are not available for programmers writing code calling
* The author names were sorted alphabetically. The authors contributed
equally to the work.
web APIs. A recent study found that a significant number of
analyzed mobile applications will fail in light of changes to
the web APIs they consume [5]. The situation is worsened as
(web) applications are increasingly developed using dynamic
languages like JavaScript, which generally also have minimal
static checking.
As an example of resulting errors, we found code in GitHub
that mistakenly attempts to make a request to https://api.
spotify.com/v1/seach, as opposed to invoking the cor-
rect URL ending with /search. Another example we found
(Figure 1) attempts to invoke the deprecated Google Maps
Engine API.1 A programmer wishing to avoid these errors
can manually assess the correctness of web API requests
by consulting the API’s (online) documentation or formal
web API specifications. Such specifications, like the OpenAPI
Specification [6] (formerly known as Swagger, the name we
will use for the rest of the paper) can be created by API
providers or third parties to document valid URLs, HTTP
methods, as well as inputs and outputs that a web API expects.
Tools that can automate this manual—and thus error-prone
and tedious—checking should have two desirable features:
1) Such tools should statically analyze JavaScript source
code to automatically identify HTTP requests and re-
trieve the related URL, HTTP method, and data, which
are all encoded as strings and created using typical string
operations like concatenation. In addition, the analysis
must be inter-procedural as the strings can be assembled
across functions.
2) As input, such tools should make use of available
specifications, like Swagger, for the definitions of valid
URLs, HTTP methods, and data.
Such tools can report errors either real-time as a programmer
is writing the application, or during continuous integration. In
addition, they can help API providers to monitor usages of
their APIs in publicly available code.
In this paper, with these two features in mind, we propose an
approach that takes as input Swagger specifications and stati-
cally checks whether the web API requests in JavaScript code
conform to these specifications. Our approach first extracts the
URL string, HTTP method, and the corresponding data from
a request, using an inter-procedural static program analysis
capable of extracting strings [7], and then checks whether the
request conforms to publicly available web API specifications.
For the initial implementation, we chose to handle requests
1https://mapsengine.google.com/about/index.html
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written using the jQuery framework due to its popularity –
reportedly, 70% of websites use the jQuery framework [8].
The main contribution of our approach is in leveraging existing
work in making static whole-program analysis possible for
framework-based JavaScript web applications (i.e., [7], [9]–
[11]) and applying it to a new problem of checking whether
a request is consistent with a web API specification.
We evaluated our approach by checking whether web API
requests from over 6000 JavaScript files on GitHub2 were
consistent or inconsistent with publicly available web API
specifications provided by the APIs Guru project [12]. From
6575 requests for which we had web API specifications avail-
able, our analysis achieved a precision of 96.0% in correctly
extracting and determining that the URL and HTTP method in
a request is consistent or inconsistent with the corresponding
web API specification. Our approach also correctly extracted
and determined whether the request data was consistent or
inconsistent with the data requirements with a precision of
87.9% for payload data and 99.9% for query data. We sys-
tematically examined all the URLs and payload data that were
inconsistent with any specification (1477 cases) and found that
many of these inconsistencies were due to errors in the client
code, including calls to deprecated APIs, errors in the URLs,
and errors in data payload definitions. In only five of the 1477
cases, limitations in our static analysis affected the matching
of a request to a URL endpoint in the specification to the
point of incorrectly flagging requests as mismatches. These
limitations also extended to four out of 18 cases where request
payloads were mistakenly flagged as mismatches and two out
of 41 cases where query parameters were mistakenly flagged
as mismatches. These results show that the static analysis
is precise enough to be used in our proposed checker, for
checking an application under development, or for checking
the validity of web API usage in existing source code in case
a web API undergoes changes.3
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: After
illustrating an example (Section II), we describe our approach:
the static analysis (Section III) and the checker (Section IV).
We then present the evaluation (Section V), related work (Sec-
tion VI), threats (Section VII), and conclusion (Section VIII).
II. BACKGROUND AND EXAMPLE
In this section, we first introduce concepts and terms regard-
ing web APIs and their specifications. We then demonstrate
through an example the two steps of our approach: how we
use static analysis to extract the strings constructing a web API
request (Section II-A) and how we check the results of the
static analysis against Swagger specifications (Section II-B).
Web APIs are programmatic interfaces that applications
invoke via HTTP to interact with remote resources, such as
data or functionalities. Resources are identified by URLs while
the type of interaction (e.g., retrieval, update, deletion of a
resource) depends on the HTTP method. Following previous
2https://github.com/
3Consider the high number of changes reported for various APIs at https:
//www.apichangelog.com/
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01.  function updateLocation(feature) {  
02.    var location = feature.getPosition();  
03.    var mutation = {  
04.      features: [{  
05.        id: feature.attributes.id,  
06.        geometry: {  
07.          type: 'Point',  
08.          coordinates: [location.lng(), location.lat()],  
09.          columnName: 'geometry'  
10.        },  
11.        properties: {}  
12.      }]  
13.    }  
14.    var url = "https://www.googleapis.com/mapsengine/" +  
15.              "v1beta2/tables/" + aid +  
16.              "/features/batchPatch";  
17.    sendRequest(url, mutation, handleEditResponse);   
18.  }  
19.    
20.  function sendRequest(url, request, done, error) {  
21.    jQuery.ajax({  
22.      type: 'POST',  
23.      url: url,  
24.      dataType: 'json',  
25.      data: JSON.stringify(request),  
26.      success: function(inner_done) {  
27.        return function(data) {  
28.          requestComplete(data, inner_done);  
29.        }  
30.      }(done),  
31.      error: function(inner_done) {  
32.        return function(data) {  
33.          requestError(data, inner_done);  
34.        }  
35.      }(error),  
36.    });  
37.  }  
= data flow
= control flow
Fig. 1: Code excerpt of a request to the Google Maps Engine
API
work, we refer to the combination of a URL and HTTP method
as an API endpoint [13]. To be successfully invoked, some
endpoints depend on additional data, for example the ID of a
resource being sent as a path parameter within the URL or a
new/updated state of a resource being sent in the body of an
HTTP request.
Application developers can learn the usage of the endpoints
of an API either by consulting its online documentation,
typically presented in HTML, or by relying on a formal web
API specification. Specifications define, among other things,
an API’s endpoints as well as the data required for and returned
by requests. The OpenAPI specification (Swagger) is one of
these specifications, which enjoys broad industry support [6].
Figure 2 shows an excerpt of a Swagger document describing
the Instagram API. It defines, for example, the schemes of the
API, its host and basePath, which together form the API’s
base URL, in this case tt s://api.instagram.com/v1.
Swagger defines the different endpoints of an API in
the paths property, using URL templates (possibly con-
taining path parameters, i.e., {tag-name} in the path
/tags/{tag-name}/media/recent) and supported HTTP
methods. Per endpoint, Swagger provides a human-readable
description, definitions of the parameters (path and
query parameters as well as required HTTP bodies), definitions
of possible responses, as well as security requirements.
Entries in the definitions property describe the struc-
ture of data to send to or receive from endpoints using
JSONschema notation [14] or a XML Object notation that
is specific to Swagger. Data definitions can be referenced
from endpoint definitions, as is exemplary shown for the
TagMediaListResponse definition in Figure 2.
A. Determining the content of a request in JavaScript code
The first step of the checker is to extract the specifics of
web API requests in the code. Our approach employs an inter-
procedural static analysis to extract URL and input strings
from a web API request in JavaScript code. Recall the code
in Fig. 1 as an example. Focusing on the url variable, we
can see that it is composed from two constant strings and the
aid variable in the function updateLocation. The value of
url is then passed to sendRequest, where it flows into the
jQuery.ajax call. The value of aid is a parameter and could
be different in multiple runs. Hence, when we aim to extract
the URL used in this request, we denote aid as a symbolic
value {aid} using curly braces, indicating that the value is not
known statically. Overall, the URL extracted for the shown
request is https://www.googleapis.com/mapsengine/
v1beta2/tables/{aid}/features/batchInsert.
As this example shows, a simple textual search like
grep would not be effective because the call site of the
request (e.g., sendRequest in Figure 1) can be different
from the definition of the URL string (updateLocation in
Figure 1). In addition, given a URL string can be assembled
across multiple functions and lexical scopes (e.g., the URL
https://api.instagram.com/v1/tags/{tag-name}/me
dia/recent which our static analysis correctly extracts from
the code excerpts in Figure 3), resolving such an URL string
requires non-trivial data flow analysis. The same holds for the
HTTP method or request data values, which may be created
within multiple functions.
B. Checking a request against a web API Specification
The second step of our approach checks whether the
extracted information from the web API requests conforms
with web API specifications. Consider, for example, the URL
https://api.instagram.com/v1/tags/{searchHashtag}
/media/recent?client_id=1e3... extracted by our
static analysis from the code excerpt in Figure 3. Our check
would start by determining whether it - together with the
associated method - targets an actual endpoint defined in
the Swagger specification of the Instagram API, including
the searchHashtag path parameter. In addition, we can
check whether the client_id parameter is expected by the
endpoint or if there are other query parameters required,
which are missing in the URL. Finally, we can check if the
data sent in the request body adheres to the data definitions
in the Swagger specification.
Another option to check whether a web API request is
correct would be to perform a dynamic analysis [15]. However,
invocations of web APIs often require authentication (for
example, using API keys), so that a system using dynamic
analysis would need to provision keys to register and even
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swagger: ’2.0’
schemes:
- https
host: api.instagram.com
basePath: /v1
paths:
’/tags/{tag-name}/media/recent’:
get:
description: Get a list of recently tagged media.
parameters:
- description: The tag name.
in: path
name: tag-name required: true type: string
- description: Count of tagged media to return.
in: query
name: count
required: false
type: integer
responses:
’200’:
description: List of media entries with this tag.
schema:
$ref: ’#/definitions/TagMediaListResponse’
definitions:
TagMediaListResponse:
properties:
data:
description: ...
type: array
items:
$ref: ‘#/definitions/MediaEntry‘
Fig. 2: Excerpt of a Swagger specification
for the Instagram API, highlighting the GET
/tags/{tag-name}/media/recent endpoint
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01.  $(document).ready(function() {  
02.    var clientID = '1e31ec2d23d0411c94d896c5f5d75886';  
03.    var searchHashtag;  
04.    $('#submitHashtag').click(function() {  
05.      searchHashtag = $('#searchTag').val();  
06.      searchInstagram(searchHashtag);  
07.    })  
08.     
09.    function searchInstagram(tag) {  
10.      $.ajax({  
11.        type: "GET",  
12.        dataType: "jsonp",  
13.        cache: false,  
14.        url: "https://api.instagram.com/v1/tags/" + tag  
15.              + "/media/recent?client_id=" + clientID,  
16.        success: function(data) {  
17.          for (var i = 0; i < data.data.length; i++) {  
18.            if (data.data[i].location != null) {  
19.              data.data[i];  
20.            }  
21.          }  
22.        }  
23.      });  
24.    }  
25.  })  
= data flow
Fig. 3: Code excerpt of a request to the Instagram API
agree to the terms of service. Typically, terms of service are
not easy to understand by a layman, and are much less likely to
be encoded in a machine readable form to allow a program to
decide whether or not to comply with the terms. Finally, even
if the key provisioning issue was addressed, ensuring dynamic
analysis has the proper code coverage is challenging.
III. WEB API USAGE EXTRACTION
A fundamental part of our approach is to detect and extract
web API usages from JavaScript source code. Figure 4 shows
the web API usage extractor pipeline. The input is a JavaScript
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Fig. 4: Web API Usage Extractor Overview.
file. The output is web API usage including URLs and request
payloads in JSON format. The decision to have a single
JavaScript file as input, i.e., setting the analysis scope to
the file-level as opposed to the program-level, is based on
our initial observations that the input strings are often in
the same file as the requests. This decision also supports
an analysis light-weight enough to be used repeatedly during
development. For the rest of this section, we describe the three
main components in the pipeline:
Field-based Call Graph Builder: The extractor takes a
JavaScript file as input and parses the script, excluding files
with syntax errors. The analysis then translates the script into
the intermediate representation and builds an approximate call
graph, called a field-based call graph [7]. A field-based call
graph is a statement-level call graph that uses one abstraction
for all instances of each property used in the program, as
opposed to one abstraction for each property of each abstract
object as in traditional call graphs; this has been shown to
scale well for framework-based JavaScript web applications
even in the presence of JavaScript’s dynamic features [9].
In our implementation, we used the field-based call graph
construction available in WALA [16]. For optimization, this
call graph construction in WALA used to ignore all data
flow that does not involve functions. To support our string
analysis, we extended the data flow analysis in the call graph
construction to also track data flow of strings in the program.
We take all functions in the script as entry points for the call
graph. Standard approaches take event handlers and top-level
blocks as entry points. However, if we were to use the same
approach, our analysis with the scope at the file-level could
miss entry points if functions are registered as event handlers
in a script beyond the analysis scope.
Web Request Locator: To identify API invocations, we look
for framework-specific patterns in the call graph. For jQuery,
we handle the most common patterns, i.e., function calls to
$.ajax, $.get, and $.post. We note instructions that make
such calls and use them as the seeds for the inter-procedural
data flow analysis, the next component in the pipeline. When
a script does not contain a matched invocation statement,
our analysis does not produce any output and the pipeline
terminates.
Backward Slicer for Request Marshaling: In this step,
we extract the statements that contribute to the input of the
web API invocations. Starting from each request function
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01.  "request": {  
02.    "cache": false,  
03.    "success": "anonymousFunctionID",  
04.    "dataType": "jsonp",  
05.    "type": "GET",  
06.    "url": "https://api.instagram.com/v1/tags/{searchHashtag}/" +  
07.           "media/recent?client_id=d1e31ec2d23d0411c94d896c5f5d75886"  
08.  }  
Fig. 5: Extracted API usage for the example in Figure 3.
call captured in the previous step, we apply standard inter-
procedural backward slicing [17] to narrow down the subset of
statements of the program that affect the statement containing
the request. In our implementation, we used the WALA
backward slicer [16]. To get the actual strings pertaining to the
URL and other parameters in a request, we recover all possible
data flows that lead to the request. String values that cannot be
determined until runtime are represented by symbolic values
(e.g., the value of searchHashtag in Figure 3 is retrieved
from the front-end in line 5). For strings with symbolic values,
we model common string operators (i.e., concatenations and
encodeURI). For constant strings, we model additional string
operators including substring, replace, and indexOf.
Currently, research on robust and scalable modeling of string
operators with symbolic values is still ongoing [18]–[21].
However, we believe these cases are not significant in the web
API usage extraction. This assumption is also supported by the
observations in the experiment: we only found two cases where
this limitation led the checker to incorrectly flag a string URL
as a mismatch to the specification (Section V-B).
We assume all execution paths leading to the request are
feasible and we thus perform path-insensitive data flow analy-
sis. It is possible that a variable has multiple definitions from
different paths. For example, Figure 6 shows two common
patterns where multiple URLs can be extracted from a request.
In Figure 6a, variable query in line 7 can have different values
depending on the predicate in line 2. In Figure 6b, function
changeDisplayStuffs can be invoked with different param-
eter values in line 8 and 9. For such cases, we take the union
of all possible values. Finally, we output the analysis result in
JSON fo mat. The analysis output for the example shown in
Figure 3 is presented in Figure 5 as an example. The extracted
data contains the retrieved URL and HTTP method as well as
all other properties passed to the $.ajax function.
IV. CHECKING PROCEDURE
The goal of the checking procedure is to match the informa-
tion produced by the static analysis against formal web API
specifications. The procedure reveals inconsistencies between
the request implementation and the specification. In general,
the information about each request consists of (1) one URL
of the web API to invoke, including the path identifying the
endpoint and possibly a query string, (2) the HTTP method,
and when required (3) data being sent in the payload body
of the request. Due to the nature of the analysis, though, in
practice multiple URL values, HTTP methods, and payload
data can be retrieved for a single request because the static
analysis considers all possible execution paths to the invoca-
8/24/2016 www.planetb.ca/projects/syntaxHighlighter/popup.php
http://www.planetb.ca/projects/syntaxHighlighter/popup.php 1/1
01.  var query = "track:" + ... + "artist" + ...;  
02.  if (query.split("#").length > 1) { // forbidden character  
03.    query = query.split("#")[0] + query.split("#")[1];  
04.  }  
05.    
06.  $.ajax({  
07.    url: "http://api.spotify.com/v1/search?q=" + query + "&type=track",  
08.    ...  
09.  });  
(a) Multiple paths
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01.  function changeDisplayStuffs(trackID) {  
02.    $.ajax({  
03.      url: "https://api.spotify.com/v1/tracks/" + trackID,  
04.      ...  
05.    });  
06.  }  
07.    
08.  changeDisplayStuffs("1HbcclMpw0q2WDWpdGCKdS");  
09.  changeDisplayStuffs("79qlNzUpZzZeXLior0zdtz");  
(b) Multiple callers
Fig. 6: Code excerpts exemplifying the extraction of multiple
URLs for one request.
tion (as mentioned previously in Section III). We designed
the checking procedure to compare any possible combinations
of these data points against a web API specification. If any
combination matches a specification, no error is reported so
as to not annoy users with false positives.
A. Checking endpoints
The first part of the procedure aims to match a request to
an endpoint defined in an API specification. The procedure
starts by checking whether any of the URLs for a given
request begins with any of the base URLs of the known
API specifications. If an API specification contains more than
one base URL, for example as it defines schemes HTTP and
HTTPS, all versions are checked. Furthermore, it is possible
that multiple specifications are found to match to a request,
for example because multiple specification versions exist for
the same API or because the static analysis reports multiple
URLs for the request. If no specification can be matched, the
procedure reports an error, instructing users to check whether
the base URL is defined correctly.
Next, the procedure attempts to match a request’s URLs
to paths defined in the API specifications. To match a path,
the procedure takes every URL of a request and compares it
against the path definitions in every specification previously
matched to that request. Every path definition of the request’s
URL strings is retrieved by truncating the base URL defined
in the specification and the query string, if it exists. The
remaining path strings are then compared against the path
definitions in the specifications by checking whether every
path component (separated by "/") matches. This matching
considers that both, the path strings from the URLs and the
Swagger path definitions, may contain variables denoted by
curly brackets. The procedure treats these path components
as wild cards. Multiple path definitions may be matched to a
single request, because multiple specifications can be matched
and because a request may contain multiple URLs.
Finally, the procedure determines if the HTTP method
matches the specification. If the static analysis does not report
an HTTP method, the method is assumed to be GET. Any
method determined by the static analysis is checked against all
methods defined in all matched specifications and all matched
paths.
B. Checking request data
For requests that can be matched to an endpoint definition
in an API specification, the procedure additionally checks the
validity of request data (if it exists). Request data is either
the data sent in the payload body of a request (typically of
POST, PUT, or PATCH requests) and the data sent within a
query string.
1) Checking payload data: Data sent in the payload body
of an HTTP request can be in any format. As the static analysis
focuses on JavaScript, and because its the prevalent data
format in web APIs [22], we focus on data in the JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON). Swagger specifications allow the
expected payload data to be defined, either for certain paths
(across all methods) or for specific endpoints (an endpoint-
level definition overrules a path-level one). Payload data defi-
nitions can be specified in place, or by referencing definitions
in the central definitions section of the specification. The
procedure considers all these ways to define payloads and, if
needed, resolves conflicts of definitions on different levels. If
any of the matched specifications defines a payload schema
in any of the matched endpoints, the procedures determines if
the payload data reported in the request information adheres
to that schema or not. A possible violation is that a property
marked as required in the schema is not present in the data.
2) Checking query parameters: The query data is encoded
in key-value pairs. Within API specifications, query parameters
can be defined as either optional or required. The checking
procedure, then, can determine whether all required query
parameters are present in a request. Again, the procedure con-
siders definitions of query parameters from different locations
in a specification and to resolve possible conflicts between
definitions on different levels. To check the query parameters,
the procedure parses the query strings of all URLs reported for
a request. It then checks whether any of the found parameter
sets matches the parameter definitions found in any of the
endpoint definitions matched for the request.
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate the web API request checker described in Sec-
tions III and IV, we applied it to the problem of identifying and
checking whether JavaScript web APIs requests are consistent
or inconsistent with a API specifications. The input of the
checker is a set of JavaScript code mined from GitHub as
well as a set of Swagger specifications (Section V-A).
For the evaluation, we are interested in two research ques-
tions:
• RQ1: Given JavaScript code describing a web API re-
quest, to what degree can the analysis correctly determine
whether the request is consistent with an endpoint in
given Swagger specifications? (See Section V-B)
• RQ2: For a request consistent with an endpoint in the
Swagger specifications, to what degree can the analysis
correctly determine whether the request data (the payload
and the query parameters) is consistent with specifica-
tions? (See Section V-C and Section V-D)
For both of these questions, we first determined quantita-
tively how consistent were the information extracted from the
static analysis compared to Swagger specifications. To obtain
this quantitative information, we count positive matches as
well as errors reported from our checking procedure.
For the set of requests that does not match endpoints or
request data requirements of a specification, we determined
if each of the inconsistent instances was legitimate or due to
deficiencies in the approach. To ascertain the cause of each
of these inconsistencies, we performed a qualitative analy-
sis. For example, the analysis determined that the endpoint
https://api.instagram.com/v1/subscriptions is in-
consistent with the Swagger specification of the Instagram API
because the specification does not contain a /subscriptions
path. The qualitative analysis determined that this particular
path was deprecated from Instagram’s API. With the result of
the qualitative analysis, we tabulated the number of instances
where the approach correctly identifies endpoints and request
data as consistent or inconsistent.
A. Data Collection
The evaluation requires two types of input data: First, we
obtained web API specifications to compare against infor-
mation produced by the static analysis using the checking
procedure. Second, we mined JavaScript source code that
(likely) contains requests to the APIs for which we have
specifications.
1) API specifications from APIs Guru: For the Swagger
specifications, we made use of a community-maintained col-
lection of specifications from the APIs Guru repository [12].
The repository contains specifications either provided by API
providers or third-parties, or generated using dedicated scripts.
At the time of performing the experiments, we collected 260
specifications, which pertain to 230 APIs (with some APIs
having specifications for multiple versions). These specifica-
tions act as a source of ground truth to indicate whether
requests in the source code invoke the API correctly. We
discuss threats to this ground truth in Section VII.
2) JavaScript files from GitHub: To increase the gener-
alizability of the results, we aimed to collect a large set of
JavaScript files containing web API calls. We obtained such
a set by querying GitHub using its search capabilities.4 Each
search query targets the domain name of an available Swagger
specification from APIs Guru and JavaScript instances that
send requests using the jQuery function $.ajax() (though
we handle additional ways to make requests, i.e., $.post
and $get). We thus used the search queries of the form
extension:js "$.ajax" "{domainName}". To automate
the data collection, we used Selenium [23] to invoke the
GitHub code search and crawled the search result to obtain
links to JavaScript files. The files returned by the search may
4https://github.com/search
not necessarily contain requests to the target domain. For
example, the domain name may be in a comment and the
script still matches the search criteria. From these queries, we
obtained 6746 JavaScript files, from which we extracted 19668
web API requests.
For this evaluation, we focused on the 6575 requests that
matched a specification (i.e., a request URL matching the
base URL of a specification, including matching the schemes,
domain, and the basepath). We removed the remaining 13093
requests from our evaluation, with 9915 of the requests were
safe to remove: These requests neither contained web API
calls (4926)5 nor were the requests the GitHub search intended
to target (i.e., 4989 requests that did not match the domain
of any of the evaluated APIs). The remaining 3178 requests
corresponded to URLs that could not be resolved by our
static analysis, e.g., containing symbolic values in the base
URL. Some of the symbolic values were global variables
that could have been resolved if the analysis scope were
expanded beyond the file-level, while other symbolic values
were not typically possible to be resolved by static analysis
(e.g., values provided to the application at run-time by a user
or a configuration file). The strength of our approach is that
our analysis does not raise a false alarm on these 3178 cases.
B. Endpoint Results
For RQ1, the goal was to determine what percentage of
the request endpoint URLs extracted from code was correctly
flagged as consistent or inconsistent with the Swagger specifi-
cations, i.e., the precision of the approach. The JavaScript files
obtained from GitHub as described in Section V-A contained
6575 requests in which the endpoint of a URL matched one
of the Swagger specifications, i.e., matches the base URL,
including matching the defined schemes (http or https),
domain, and the basepath.
Overall, we found the precision of matching the endpoints
of requests to be 96.0%, which was tabulated from requests
that were flagged consistent and were actually consistent ( -
5098 requests in the upper left cell in Figure 7a), and requests
that were flagged inconsistent and were actually inconsistent
( - 1216 requests in Figure 7a). In addition to matching
the base URL in a Swagger specification, a request is a
valid endpoint when it satisfies two conditions: (1) the URL
matches an endpoint path, which can contain path variables
(e.g., /repos/{owner}/{repo}) and (2) the HTTP method
matches (e.g., GET).
For the 1477 requests that did not match to a valid endpoint
( and , the “Flagged as inconsistent” row in Figure 7a), we
qualitatively determined if the static analysis checker correctly
identified a legitimate inconsistency or not. We found that
a significant fraction of these requests were true negatives
due to errors in the actual URLs from the JavaScript code
5 Of the 4926 requests, 4177 requests contained URLs targeting internal
endpoints (including relative URLs, localhosts, IP addresses), not web APIs;
567 requests only contained empty strings, null values, or numeric values;
and 182 requests contained URLs matching the domain but not the base
path, likely to be targeting static web pages or data.
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Fig. 7: Distribution of the 6575 extracted endpoint invocations
(139, 2.11%) and incomplete, missing, or erroneous Swagger
specifications (1077, 16.4%), together pertaining to 1216 re-
quests ( in Figure 7a). The remaining 261 requests were
false positives ( in Figure 7a) due to deficiencies in the static
analysis (5, 0.08%) and in the checking procedure (256, 3.9%).
For the rest of Section V-B we present the qualitative analysis
of the results on these true negatives and false positives.
Endpoint Results: True Negatives -
Requests that were correctly flagged as inconsistent fall into
two categories: definite or potential errors in the code, and
erroneous and incomplete specifications.
For the first category, we found that 139 requests contained
an erroneous URL from the JavaScript code that we correctly
flagged as inconsistent, accounting for 2.1% of the 6575
requests (Figure 7b). Of the 139 requests, 23 were attributed to
deprecated calls and programming errors that were definitely
erroneous:
• Deprecated APIs: 16 requests were inconsistent because
a URL corresponded to a call to an API that were
deprecated entirely, or calls to subset of an API that
happened to be deprecated. For example, the request to
https://www.googleapis.com/freebase/v1/text/en
/bob_dylan was to the Google’s Freebase Internet
Marketing API, which has been deprecated since June
30, 2015.6
• Documented Programming Errors: In two cases, we
found evidence (e.g., in the form of a question posted
on a forum) that the URLs in the code were erroneously
constructed because of errors in interpreting API docu-
mentation.7
• Typographical errors: In five cases, the requests
contained obvious typographical errors. For example,
https://api.spotify.com/v1/seach did not
6https://developers.google.com/freebase/v1/topic-overview
7http://stackoverflow.com/questions/11606101/
how-to-get-user-email-from-google-plus-oauth
match the endpoint search in the Swagger
specification of the Spotify API because of the
typographical error in “seach”. In another case,
the checker reported that the extracted URL string
’https://api.spotify.com/v1/users/’+userID+
/playlists/+playlistID+’/tracks’ (a string
that looked like a syntax error because of the
absence of quotes surrounding /playlists/)
did not match any endpoints in the Spotify
API, even though there was an endpoint
http://api.spotify.com/v1/users/{userId}/play
lists/{playlistId}/tracks in the Spotify’s
Swagger specification. One could argue that the checker
flagging this case as a mismatch was a mistake,
because at runtime, /playlists/ without the quotes
actually evaluates to the string ’/playlists/’ as
/playlists/ is interpreted as a regular expression.
However, we argue that marking this case as a mismatch
is legitimate because it is likely that the author of the
code intended to include the quotes ’/playlist/’ but
this potential error was not caught by the JavaScript
interpreter nor testing.
In addition, we found 116 requests with potential errors:
• HTTP method: In 112 cases, the URL was
using the wrong HTTP method, e.g., using GET
instead of POST as specified in a Swagger
specification. Of these cases, 74 were GET requests to
https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v1/token
info that should be POST according to the Swagger
specification and online API documentation, even though
the server accepts the GET call. We categorized these
cases as potential errors because even when an API
provider may accept such calls, it is still worth-while to
warn a programmer that the call is not consistent with
the definition of the API.
• Port number: We observed four requests in which a URL
contained port numbers. These cases may be problem-
atic because port numbers are seldom in any publicly
advertised base URLs. For the four cases involving port
numbers, one could argue that it was worth issuing
a warning to a programmer because port numbers are
unlikely to be in a legitimate base URL. With the static
checker that could flag that a URL in the requests were
consistent with a basepath but not any of an endpoint, a
programmer authoring code containing these 155 cases
could potentially made aware of these bugs.
For the second category of the true negatives, we found
that 1077 requests (or 16.4%; Figure 7b) corresponded to
invocations that were not matched with any endpoint of
the corresponding Swagger specifications. From a manual
inspection on the documentation on the API being invoked in
the requests, we found that the mismatch was due to erroneous
and incomplete Swagger specifications:
• Errors in Swagger specifications: We determined
that 867 cases due to errors in the Swagger
specifications. These erroneous requests were
because a base path had been refactored to include
a version number (e.g., the 1.0 path segment in
https://mandrillapp.com/api/1.0/messages/
send.json) but the Swagger specification was not
updated.
• Missing endpoints in Swagger specifications: For 210
requests in which a URL found by the static analysis and
verified by us as valid calls, a corresponding endpoint
definition with the assumed path was missing from the
Swagger specifications. These requests corresponded to
18 endpoints across four APIs: Reactome, Slack, Trello,
and Google APIs.
• Missing authorization URLs in Swag-
ger specifications: Eight URLs relate to
endpoints for authentication purposes, e.g.,
https://slack.com/api/oauth.access and
https://trello.com/1/appKey/generate. A
complete Swagger specification should include such
necessary authentication URLs. However, in these 8
cases those authentication URLs were missing in the
specifications.
As it turned out, the 1077 requests flagged by the checker as
inconsistent with the Swagger specification were actual errors
in the Swagger specification. Upon informing APIs Guru of
these errors, we learned that these specifications were already
corrected.8 This scenario demonstrates a potential use case
for using the checker on a large repository of API usage for
identifying missing or erroneous information on a given set of
Swagger specifications.
Endpoint Results: False Positives -
There were two sources of mistakingly flagging a request
to be a mismatch: deficiencies in the static analysis and
deficiencies in the checking procedure. For the first source of
errors, we found that only five out of the 1496 cases were due
limitations in the static analysis – which is surprising, given
the challenges in analyzing JavaScript and that the analysis
scope was within a file. There were two types of deficiencies:
• Limitation of the analysis scope: In three cases, because
the analysis scope was within a file, the analysis failed to
construct a valid URL because the code contains variables
or function calls defined outside the file.
• Handling string library functions: In two cases, the
requests used the library function split. In the static
analysis, we explicitly model other more common string
operations, i.e., string concatenations and encodeURI, as
we described in Section III. Currently, handling a more
complete set of string library functions with symbolic
values is an active research topic [18]–[21]. We could
leverage such research and model more string operators
in the future.
8http://www.apiful.io/intro/2016/05/16/challenges-in-maintaining-specs.
html
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Fig. 8: RQ2 results for payload (a) and query data (b)
The few deficiencies caused by the static analysis show that
our technique and the chosen analysis scope are feasible for
the problem of extracting requests.
Due to deficiencies of the checking procedure, our approach
mistakenly determined that 256 requests were inconsistent
with Swagger specifications. There are two main causes of
these mistakes:
• Conservative Matching: We designed to checker
be confident in flagging requests as “consistent
with the Swagger”, at the risk of flagging
legitimate URLs as potentially inconsistent. In
consequence, we found 251 requests that the procedure
mistakenly flagged as inconsistent with any of the
Swagger specifications. For example, the code
page.config.baseUrl+’tags/’+term+’media/
recent?client_id=’+page.config.clientId
should have matched the endpoint tags/{tag}/
media/recent. However, the checking procedure
requires that the variable is constrained to a single path
segment, i.e., characters without a ’/’ in it.
• Missing authorization URLs: In five cases, the requests
were for authorization. These URLs are defined in a
Swagger file but the checker does not currently check
for such URLs.
Overall, using the checker for determining whether an
invocation of an web API endpoint corresponds to a valid
one in a Swagger specification yielded a promising result,
with 96.0% of the endpoint invocations correctly flagged as
consistent or inconsistent with the Swagger specifications.
C. Payload Data Results
For RQ2, we focused on how well the analysis correctly
determines whether the request data is consistent with web
API specifications. We present the results for the payload data
in this Section V-C and query data in Section V-D.
To assess the approach’s ability to check for correct payload
data, we first determine how many of the 5098 requests for
which we can match an endpoint have a payload schema
definition in any of the corresponding API specifications. We
only consider requests for which the payload definition is
mandatory, i.e., if the request matches multiple specifications
or multiple endpoints as described in Section IV, they all need
to denote a payload definition. We found that overall 140
requests have a mandatory payload definition (see Figure 8a).
Out of these 140 cases, we found that 122 requests ( )
contained data extracted from the static analysis that adheres to
the required payload. Of the 18 payloads that did not adhere to
any of the specifications, we qualitatively ascertained whether
the approach correctly determined the mismatches (i.e., true
negatives which correspond to in Figure 8a) or not (i.e.,
false positives which correspond to ). Tabulating the matched
cases ( ) with the true negatives ( ) yields a precision of
87.9%.
Payload Data Results: True Negatives ( )
The single true negative case is caused by an error in the
code: While the analysis reports a required data property to
be sent in a query parameter, the specification requires it to
be sent in the payload body.
Payload Data Results: False Positives ( )
The 17 false positive cases are explained by deficiencies in
the static analysis. In 13 cases, the static analysis does actually
report data that, upon manual inspection, does match with the
data schema in the specification. However, in these cases, the
data is present as a JSON-encoded string in the request source
code (rather than a JSON object), so our checking procedure
fails to correctly match it. In four other cases, the analysis
reports a variable to be replaced by a global JSON string,
which cannot be resolved statically.
D. Query Parameter Results
Regarding the query parameters, we first determined how
many of the 5098 requests for which we could match an
endpoint have query parameters defined in the API specifica-
tions. Like in the case of the payload data, we only considered
requests that match an endpoint that has a mandatory query
parameter definition, of which we found 3124. Figure 8b
presents the breakdown of these requests. We found that 3083
of the requests ( ) complied with their corresponding query
parameter definitions. We qualitatively analyzed the 41 cases
in which our approach reported a mismatch, of which 39 were
true negatives ( ) and 2 were false positives ( ). The precision
is 99.9%, taking into account the matches ( ) and the true
negatives ( ).
Query Parameter Results: True Negatives - ( )
The 39 cases in which our approach correctly detects an
inconsistency between source code and specification fall into
two categories:
• Errors in the specification: 15
cases concern GET requests to the
../repos/{owner}/repo/contributors path of
the GitHub API. According to the API specification, a
query parameter anon is required to indicate whether
to list anonymous contributors. Invoking this endpoint
test-wise reveals that requests also succeed without that
parameter in the request, pointing to an error in the
specification.
• Errors in the code: We find 24 cases where required
data is sent in the wrong place. In 11 cases, GET
requests to the ../artists/{id}/top-tracks path
of the Spotify API miss a country query parame-
ter, which is required according to the API’s specifi-
cation and online documentation. Interestingly, though,
all 11 requests send a country data property in
their payload body. Similar cases can be observed for
five GET requests to the ../artists path and two
GET requests to the ../me/following/contains and
../me/tracks/contains paths, where, again, required
query parameters are sent in the payload body instead.
Similarly, in four POST requests to the Instagram API,
one GET request to the Slack API, and one GET request
to the Buffer API, query parameters, which are required
based on the specification, are sent in the payload body
instead.
Query Parameter Results - False Positives ( )
We observe two cases where the static analysis misses to
report an inconsistency because the extracted URLs end with a
variable. The variable spans across parts of the endpoint path
and possibly the query parameters. Thus, in this cases, the
analysis fails to report required query parameters.
Overall, out of the 39 reported query parameter mismatches,
15 cases are explained by errors in the specification - required
parameters are actually not necessary for a successful request.
In 24 cases, query parameters that are required according to
the specification are sent in the payload body of the request
instead, which is, in most of these cases, in conflict with both,
the API specification and online documentation. Only in two
cases do we find mismatches due to our approach’s failure to
report needed information.
VI. RELATED WORK
Our work on checking JavaScript code with respect to web
API specifications is similar in spirit to a range of work on
checking and bug finding approaches, such as TypeScript [24]
and JSHint [25], respectively. Due to the dynamic nature of
JavaScript, and the extreme difficulty of providing precise
analysis, such languages and tools tend to be lenient; rather
than attempting to be complete, they work by partially enforc-
ing type rules or using a set of patterns that can be tuned to
provide some level of feedback without overwhelming their
users with a large number of false reports. Our work shares
that approach: our analysis is biased to only report issues that
are fairly likely to be real. However, our approach differs from
other bug finding tools for JavaScript by being based on inter-
procedural static analysis, and relying on traditional techniques
such as inter-procedural slicing and string analysis.
Halfond et al. introduce static analysis techniques for under-
standing web API usage in Java applications [26], [27]. One
technique focuses on how APIs are used in HTML code that is
dynamically generated as part of a Java web application [26].
The work focuses on first approximating the HTML and then
extracting invocations from it. This approach works well when
the logic creating the request is on the server side; it does
not target API calls generated in JavaScript on the client
side, which is our focus. Other work introduces symbolic
execution to improve results, once again focusing on Java web
application [27].
In the context of JavaScript, related work has shown that
understanding API specifications can make dynamic testing
more effective [28]. In contrast to this work, we focus on
static analysis rather than on dynamic testing. Our work also
relates to checking JavaScript function calls. SAFEWAPI [29]
analyzes JavaScript and checks function calls against the web
IDL specifications of those functions. SAFEWapp [30] models
the web application execution environment (e.g., DOM) and
checks function invocations against ECMAScript rules. In
comparison, we check web API requests, which is not a
language construct in JavaScript. In addition, resolving the
targets (endpoints) and parameters requires string analysis.
Multiple works have been proposed to check web APIs
for compliance with best-practices [22], [31]. These works
currently take as input observed web API requests [22] or
human-readable documentations [31], but could be adapted to
work on top of API specifications. In contrast to checking
specifications, we here propose to check the adherence of
source code with given specifications.
VII. THREATS TO VALIDITY
By considering the URL, HTTP method, and request data,
our approach covers important parts that determine whether
a request contains any errors or not. However, our approach
currently does not examine request headers, which can, for
example, contain authentication information that affects the
validity of a request. Despite this limitation, our approach is
still a valuable first step towards a wider coverage of errors
on web API requests.
A threat to validity of our evaluation is in the way we
retrieved source code from GitHub (see Section V-A). Our
data collection relies on the code search facilities provided by
GitHub.9 GitHub only provides limited insights into the search
algorithm, for example, that characters like “.”, “/”, or “\” will
be ignored and that only small repositories (less than 384 KB
and less than 500,000 files) are indexed.10
The API specifications we used in our experiments may
contain errors, similar to any other type of documentation.
However, we consider APIs Guru to be one of the most reliable
9https://github.com/search
10https://help.github.com/articles/searching-code/
sources of API specifications. They have a policy in place to
validate specifications that are not updated within 48 hours.
In addition, APIs Guru reports the origin of specifications
(which typically stem from API providers or the developer
community).
Finally, a threat to the validity of our experiments is that we
manually analyze the errors reported by our checking method.
We performed this analysis to shine a light on the sources of
errors and took care to cross-validate among multiple sources
as much as possible.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have leveraged existing research in static
analysis scalable to framework-based JavaScript web appli-
cations and created an analysis capable of extracting strings
pertaining to web APIs requests. We used these extracted
request data as input to a checker that determines whether
the requests are consistent or inconsistent with formal web
API specifications. A qualitative analysis of the results from
our checker on 6575 requests shows that most of reported
inconsistencies were due to errors in the client code (calls to
deprecated APIs, errors in the URLs, errors in data payload
definitions) and incomplete Swagger specifications, as opposed
false positives. Quantitatively, we found that the approach
can correctly determine whether a request is consistent or
inconsistent with web API specification with a high precision
of 96.0% for endpoint checking, 87.9% for payload data
checking, and 99.9% for query parameter checking.
These results point to the promise in creating tools that are
capable of warning programmers of source code containing in-
consistent web API requests that can be potentially erroneous.
As such, this approach can be integrated with existing tools
that support developers in using web APIs [1]. Our proposed
checker can also be employed with continuous integration for
checking the validity of web API usage in case a web API
undergoes changes. Furthermore, our work can lead to tools
to help API providers to monitor usages of their APIs in
publicly available code or integrate with third-parties change
monitoring sites such as API ChangeLog.11 As for future work
on the checker itself, we aim to extend the scope of our static
checking method to consider additional aspects of web API
requests like header information, HTTP response codes, or the
structure of returned data. In addition, based on the positive
results with jQuery, we want to extend our implementation to
handle other web frameworks.
11https://www.apichangelog.com/
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